Abstract: Schattschneider's insight that "policies make politics" has played an influential role in the modern study of political institutions and public policy. Yet if policies do indeed make politics, rational politicians clearly have opportunities to use policies to create a future structure of politics more to their own advantage-and this strategic dimension has gone almost entirely unexplored. Do politicians actually use policies to make politics? Under what conditions? In this paper, we develop a theoretical argument about what can be expected from strategic politicians, and we carry out an empirical analysis on a policy development that is particularly instructive: the adoption of public sector collective bargaining laws by the states during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s-laws that fueled the rise of public sector unions, and "made politics" to the great advantage of Democrats over Republicans. 1 In his classic study of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, Schattschneider (1935) famously argued that policies make their own politics. Scholars in American political development, public policy, and comparative politics have since brought this notion to the theoretical center of their work and have provided considerable evidence that he was right (Hacker and Pierson, 2014) .
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In his classic study of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, Schattschneider (1935) famously argued that policies make their own politics. Scholars in American political development, public policy, and comparative politics have since brought this notion to the theoretical center of their work and have provided considerable evidence that he was right (Hacker and Pierson, 2014) .
The adoption of Social Security, for example, created a constituency of senior citizens so supportive of the program that it became politically untouchable (Campbell, 2003) . The adoption of airline deregulation led to a restructuring of the airline industry that transformed the interests of the major players, giving them incentives to support a deregulated system that most had initially opposed (Patashnik, 2008) . The adoption of welfare state policies of various kinds throughout the developed world generated new mass constituencies that powerfully resisted when governments tried to cut back on programs and benefits (Pierson, 1994) .
Policies shape politics whether anyone intends for it to happen or not. When a new program is created, so are new constituencies and new interests-and new politics-and in the literature, this built-in phenomenon has played a key role, via the concept of policy feedback, in scholarly explanations of the politics of public policy (e.g, Pierson, 1993; Mettler and Soss, 2004) .
But while significant progress has been made, an important dimension of inquiry has gone unexplored. For if policies make their own politics, strategic politicians would surely want to anticipate that and take advantage of it. They would want to use policy to shape the future structure of politics and power to their own benefit. In doing so, moreover, they are not limited to simply trying to enhance or fine-tune the feedback effects highlighted in the literature, in which a policy gives rise to political consequences that (often) bolster support for the policy itself. The strategic opportunities for politicians are much broader than that, and potentially far 3 disadvantage of Republicans (DiSalvo, 2015; Moe, 2011; Flavin and Hartney, forthcoming) . This is a development, then, that represents a major example of policies shaping politics. And because its partisan effects are massively asymmetric, we see it as a paradigmatic easy case: if politicians are motivated to make their policy decisions with politics-shaping consequences in mind, we should observe them doing it here. We should see Democrats pushing hard for these new labor laws and Republicans opposing them.
The second reason this policy development is so instructive is that, despite the widespread importance of public sector unions to American politics, political scientists have paid almost no attention to them in their theory and research. The literatures on parties and interest groups, in particular, virtually ignore them.
2 Precisely because Schattschneider was rightpolicies do shape politics-the labor laws that gave rise to public sector unions need to be understood as important determinants of the modern structure of American politics. And by featuring them here, and providing an empirical analysis of their political foundations, we aim to shed light on a vastly underappreciated policy development that deserves serious scholarly attention.
Our analysis unfolds in three parts. In Part 1, we start by examining whether Democrats were indeed the champions of public sector labor laws and Republicans their staunch opponents.
Using state-level data, we find little reason to doubt the Democratic half of this "obvious"
expectation, but we also show that there is a striking lack of support for the Republican half. In fact, it turns out that Republicans played pivotal roles in the adoption of these labor laws-and thus in igniting the growth of powerful new organizations that would strongly oppose
Republican candidates and objectives. Why would Republicans do that? In Part 2, we offer an 4 explanation by developing a theoretical argument about what can be expected from strategic political actors-in any realm of policy-as they think about using policies to shape the future structure of politics. The heart of the argument is that collective action problems often limit the conditions under which individual politicians will actually take these kinds of strategic actionsleading to outcomes that, in the aggregate, may look strange or irrational. In Part 3, we carry out an empirical analysis of individual-level voting by state legislators on public-sector labor laws, testing the implications of this theoretical perspective and showing that it is well supported by the evidence.
Again, we view this as an early first step. The Schattschneider-based research agenda is a rich and very promising one, and much more work remains to be done. We argue that there are good reasons, theoretical and empirical, for thinking that politicians will sometimes use policy to shape politics and that these efforts can be important-but also that there are built-in incentive problems that limit the conditions under which they will take these kinds of strategic actions.
The challenge, going forward, is to figure out how constraining these limits actually are, how consequential politicians can actually be in shaping politics to their own advantage-and what it all means, and has meant, for the larger structure of politics and power.
Part 1: Revisiting the Conventional Wisdom
During the first half of the 20 th century, American governments at all levels were broadly resistant and often hostile to the unionization of their own workers. Collective bargaining in the public sector was largely illegal throughout the country, and very few public workers belonged to organizations that could rightly be called unions. Unionization in the private sector, which had been furiously opposed by business and Republicans for decades, was given an enormous boost by the adoption of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in 1935-a hallmark of the 5 Democratic New Deal-and the membership, finances, and political involvement of private sector unions soared in subsequent years. By the late 1940s and early 1950s, the labor-Democrat alliance had been cemented and stood at the very center of the American party system, with the Democrats benefiting considerably (if still losing to Eisenhower) from a newly empowered and enlarged labor constituency that they had played a key role in creating. Public sector workers, meantime, were left on the sidelines. They were not included in the NLRA, and they remained unorganized, weak, and politically unimportant (Walker, 2014; Slater, 2004) .
Massive change, however, was just around the corner. In 1959, Wisconsin became the first state to adopt a labor law authorizing collective bargaining for public sector workers. And together with President Kennedy's 1962 executive order authorizing collective bargaining at the federal level, these early moves signaled the beginning of a stunning wave of new labor legislation across the states-modeled after the NLRA-that in little more than two decades brought legally sanctioned collective bargaining to virtually all states outside the South. Along with it came an explosion of union organizing and a huge increase in membership-which increased ten-fold between 1960 and 1976 (Goldfield, 1989-90; also Freeman, 1986; DiSalvo, 2015; Moe, 2011) .
By the early 1980s, union density in the public sector had soared to 37 percent of the public workforce (and to much higher levels in many states and cities), where it stabilized over subsequent decades. Meantime, private sector unions-beset by rising competition, globalization, and structural change in the economy-were in perpetual free fall: a decline that actually began in the late 1950s, although few realized it at the time. Today, less than 7 percent of private sector workers are unionized-and the organizational behemoths of yesteryear, such as One would think that, given the importance of these events, there would be quite a bit of scholarly work we could turn to in seeking answers. But in fact, there is very little. As we've said, political scientists have studied American politics, its interest group system, and its party system without paying serious attention to public sector unions, much less to the history of legal changes that fueled their rise to prominence. Even more surprising, perhaps, historians have not paid attention to them either (as noted by Shaffer, 2002; McCartin, 2006) . There is a huge literature on labor history, but virtually all of it focuses on private sector unions, which are universally taken to embody and represent the "union movement." The common theme is that the union movement is in decline: a phenomenon that scholars then try to explain, explore, or suggest ways of reversing. We should note that, in those rare cases when political scientists have written about unions, they have done much the same thing as historians: they have focused on unions in the private sector as the sum total of the union movement, as well as on the relationship between these private sector unions and the Democrats, and they have highlighted and explored the political consequences of union decline (e.g., Dark, 1999; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady, 2013 West, 2009; Slater, 2004; McCartin, 2006) . The importance of Democratic control also shines through in case studies of labor law adoption in particular states, such as in Saltzman's (1988) study of Illinois and Ohio.
These accounts, and many more like them, have given rise to a conventional wisdom that seems to make eminently good sense. As labor historian Joseph A. McCartin (2006, p.79) expresses it, "On the local, state, and national levels, the success of public sector unions was almost always dependent upon an alliance between those unions and Democratic politicians...The record could not be clearer on this point: without the close collaboration that emerged between public sector trade unionists and Democratic leaders at all levels of government, the public sector movement would not have grown as quickly as it did." Political scientist Alexis Walker (2015, p.190) gives a similar account: "Public sector unions' demands were ultimately translated into law by the elections of Democratic mayors, legislatures, and chief executives whose elections almost always preceded passage of public sector collective bargaining laws." Quantitative analysis affirms these conclusions. Notably, Saltzman's (1985) study of labor laws for teachers shows that these laws were more likely to be adopted to the extent that state governments were controlled by Democrats.
5 5 To our knowledge, the only account that departs from this conventional wisdom is DiSalvo (2015) , who is alone in recognizing that many Republicans voted for these labor laws (although he does not present or analyze any data on that score).
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As it stands, though, the empirical support for this conventional wisdom is exceedingly thin. Even Saltzman's (1985) 
Part 2: Theory
The strategic dimension of the Schattschneider-based theory seems compelling on its face. If policies make their own politics, then surely politicians would want to use policy to paper. We focus only on statutory changes to collective bargaining laws-not changes made by other means. Some states, we should note, enacted comprehensive duty-to-bargain laws that granted collective bargaining rights to all public employees in one legislative bill-but most states did not do that. Most chose to grant bargaining rights to some government employees (such as teachers) but not others (such as firefighters). 7 We have also carried out our own analysis similar to that of Saltzman, using Cox proportional hazard models and our own data on collective bargaining law adoption. When we include Saltzman's measure of Democratic strength (plus a dummy for the South), we (like Saltzman) find that increases in Democratic strength shorten the time to adoption. But when we model the "risk" of adoption using dummies for Democratic unified government and divided government (with Republican unified government as the excluded category), we find that divided governments were significantly more likely to adopt bargaining than Republican unified governments. Even this modeling strategy, though, masks the fact that many Republican unified governments adopted duty-to-bargain laws.
11 engineer a future structure of politics that is more to their advantage. And surely they would want to stop their opponents from doing the same. But the question is whether they have the incentives to take action along these lines.
Consider first the kind of policy feedback effects highlighted in the literature, where the focus is on how policies have the capacity-by putting benefits in the hands of mass constituencies, for example-to change politics in ways that bolster their own political support in future years, and thus enhance their own durability. Much of this is automatic. But even so, policies can be designed in various ways, some having more desirable feedback effects than others (Patashnik and Zelizer, 2013; Patashnik, 2008) . Would the politicians supporting those policies have incentives to choose the specific designs that make those feedback effects as politically desirable as possible? Would they use policy to engineer the making of politics?
There is good reason to think the answer is yes-with qualifications. In the design of his signature policy of Social Security, for example, President Roosevelt was clearly being strategic.
He insisted that it be funded through payroll contributions from each worker, believing that this particular design would increase citizens' sense of ownership and promote even greater political support for the new program (Derthick, 1979) . More generally (and presidents aside), politicians in the American system are individual entrepreneurs, rooted in their own states and districts and concerned with pleasing the distinctive constituencies and interest groups that can get them reelected. If a politician supports a given policy compatible with those underlying interests, she may have corresponding incentives-in furthering the very same interests-to adopt a design that is best suited to ensure that policy's political support and durability.
Across the full range of policies and politicians, however, the qualifications are potentially serious. Politicians may be unaware in any given case that they can actually use 12 policy to shape politics, or of what the consequences might be if they did; they are also notoriously myopic, thinking only of their next election rather than the late-order effects of policy (Arnold, 1990) ; and as Mayhew (1974) reminds us, their embrace of policy may be due to position-taking or credit-claiming, not to genuine concern for the policy's success. All these factors can weaken the strategic connection between policy and politics. Yet even granting these qualifications, the saving grace (potentially) is that there may well be interest groups, perhaps very powerful and active ones, that are aware, do look far ahead, and are genuinely concerned about the policy-and that pressure politicians to "make politics" in ways that bolster the policy's durability. All things considered, then, it is reasonable to suggest that politicians will often have incentives to take politics-shaping actions that are policy specific.
Yet they also have opportunities for strategic design that are much broader and more far- This collective action problem is well known, and it is at the heart of the modern theory of parties. The theory argues that party organizations arise in legislatures because individual party members recognize their shared fate and willingly delegate authority (along with the discretionary use of rewards, sanctions, and other tools and resources) to party leaders-who have incentives to be aware of political opportunities, to think ahead, and to promote the best interests of the party as a whole by orchestrating and constraining member votes (Cox and McCubbins, 1993) . But this solution to the collective action problem is only partial, at best. The theory of conditional party government suggests it is most effective-with members supporting stronger party constraints on their own behavior-when they are already in substantial agreement on policy and ideology (Rohde, 1991; Aldrich and Rohde, 2001) . The more diverse the members are, the weaker the enforced constraints of party, and the more members are free to follow their purely individual incentives.
One implication is that, to the extent that parties resemble the kinds of polarized, internally homogeneous organizations that have prevailed for roughly the past two decades, they are in a relatively good position to promote party discipline and (partially) mitigate the collective action problem. The modern era of polarization, then, is essentially a best-case scenario for politics-shaping behavior on the part of politicians (although even here, other parochial incentives at the individual level may get in the way). In earlier decades, however, these favorable conditions did not prevail (Mayhew, 1974; Rohde, 1991) . The parties were much more internally diverse and thus, theory would suggest, far less capable of getting their members to shape politics to the party's advantage.
The labor laws we're concerned with here, of course, were enacted during this earlier era.
So our expectation-for this or any other type of policy-is that politicians would be motivated 14 by their own individual-level concerns, not by what was best for their party as a whole. Thus, the Democratic Party stood to be hugely advantaged by the adoption of these laws, but individual Democrats would nonetheless not have incentives to vote for them on that basis. Similarly, the Republican Party stood to be greatly disadvantaged, but individual Republicans would not take that into account in deciding how to vote. How, then, would the members of these parties actually vote? What should we expect? An answer inevitably turns on the specific nature of the policy itself (Hacker and Pierson, 2014) .
For Democrats, the incentives of individual members were actually in alignment with what was best for the party as a whole. This is because Democrats (outside the South) were the party of labor, strongly allied with unions, and for virtually all Democrats (outside the South)
there were strong constituency and ideology-based reasons-purely at the individual level-for supporting these new laws. In following their own personal incentives as politicians, then, individual Democrats would automatically be making politics to the party's larger advantageeven though, theory suggests, that was not what motivated them. The collective good came along as part of a package deal.
The Republicans were in a very different situation. In the first place, while today's party can accurately be characterized as anti-union and homogeneously conservative, in earlier decades it had an appreciable number of moderates-and they were much more favorable to labor than conservatives were (Shafer, 2003) . This was an important aspect of the party's internal diversity. For this reason alone, there was a contingent of potential defectorsmoderates-who had constituency and ideology-based incentives, as individual politicians, to vote in favor of these labor laws despite their ominous future impacts on the party as a whole.
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But there was a second problem for Republicans that stood to be even more disabling.
During these earlier times, Republican conservatives were known as anti-labor because theyand their business allies-were often opposed to the private sector unions that dominated the union movement. Those unions, moreover, represented blue collar workers who were not a forceful presence in conservative constituencies. But the new labor laws under consideration pointed to a very different political equation. The employees now demanding collective bargaining rights-teachers, police officers, firefighters, nurses-were the employees of governments, not business. And these workers were a numerous, middle class, educated, and potentially very active political presence in every district, including conservative districts. Even from the standpoint of conservative Republicans, then, a vote for public sector labor laws may often have been the smart thing to do politically-with support from local constituencies, but no concentrated opposition.
So while the individual-level incentives of Democrats lined up nicely with what was best
for their party's political future, exactly the opposite was true for Republicans. Theory suggests that many had incentives to support these new labor laws-and thus, as part of the package, to inadvertently support a new structure of future politics that was bad for their party. We should expect that Republican moderates were especially inclined to do this, but also that many conservatives would do it too. Their individual incentives were simply not aligned with promoting the party's collective good-and what they would get, as a result, was a collective bad.
From the standpoint of the larger theory, these incentives best capture the essence of the collective action problems that politicians face in using policy to make politics. But they are not the only incentives at work, of course. What the theory tells us is that, if we want to predict why 16 politicians do what they do in these situations, we need to pay attention to the individual-level concerns that motivate them-and in the case of labor law, there are other additional incentives at the individual level that we need to recognize and discuss. We'll do that in the next section, as we present the specifics of our data analysis.
Part 3: Partisan Support for Collective Bargaining Laws
To explore the behavior of individual state policymakers, we compiled a new dataset.
For each duty-to-bargain law passed between 1959 and 1990, we collected the final passage votes of as many state legislators as possible. 8 The completed dataset includes 5,569 votes by individual legislators on 43 bills in 31 states, as well as the party affiliation and district number for each legislator. 9 This information allows us to identify which legislators supported collective bargaining in the states that passed duty-to-bargain laws, to explore simple (but revealing) data on how they voted, and to carry out tests of hypotheses that bear on why they voted as they did.
Our most basic and general hypothesis (H1) from the theory above is that legislators will not be motivated by collective goods and bads for their parties, but rather by individual-level incentives-and thus that Republicans will support these laws at much higher levels than the long-term impact on their party might suggest. A second basic hypothesis (H2) that flows from this focus on individual-level incentives is that Republicans from moderate districts will support these new labor laws at higher levels than Republicans from conservative districts-but that even the latter will reveal appreciable levels of support.
To fill out the analysis, let's now turn to other individual-level incentives that stand to shape legislator behavior. While members of both parties may be affected by these incentives, we expect them to have their main impacts on Republicans. This is because Democrats already have compelling reason to be overwhelmingly in favor of these labor laws, and Republicans are the ones whose votes are problematic-and often pivotal for passage. Our primary focus in the data analysis that follows will accordingly be on the Republicans.
The first of these additional incentives is quite general: most legislators are concerned about their electoral vulnerability, and thus about the likelihood of losing their next election.
Here, our hypothesis (H3) is that, to the extent that a Republican is worried about losing her next election, she will be more likely to vote for public sector labor laws.
Another important source of additional incentives has to do with the incidence of strikes.
During the decades when these laws were being considered, the nation was swept by public sector strikes as government workers and their nascent unions sought to bring pressure on policymakers. Newspaper and magazine accounts make it clear that these new developments were widely regarded as quite troubling (Shaffer, 2002) . There is evidence to suggest, moreover, that many policymakers felt a pressing need to deal with the immediate problem (or threat) of strikes, and that collective bargaining was presented by academics, labor-law experts, and union advocates as a solution to the strike problem: a practical way to substitute regularized negotiation for disruptive conflict, and thus to bring "labor peace" (McCartin, 2008) . New York's Taylor Commission, for example, was set up by Republican Governor Nelson Rockefeller in 1967 to address the state's explosive strike problem; and its solution, which soon became law, was the granting of collective bargaining rights to public sector workers-along with a provision that explicitly made strikes illegal and subject to serious penalties (O'Neil and McMahon, 2007) .
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As labor allies, Democrats already had incentives to support collective bargaining, support the right to strike (which unions regard as essential to their bargaining power), and oppose anti-strike provisions. The prevalence of new strike activities during the 1960s and 1970s didn't change their incentives much. But for Republicans, there is good reason to think their incentives were affected, and we have three hypotheses on that score.
One (H4) is that, during the early going, Republicans had incentives to see collective bargaining as a solution to the strike problem, and thus to respond to strike activity by supporting new labor laws. A second (H5) is that, as time went on and labor laws were actually adopted in many states, Republicans could directly observe whether collective bargaining was actually solving the strike problem-and as the evidence mounted, their incentives to support collective bargaining would turn on that evidence. And third (H6), Republicans had incentives to oppose right to strike provisions, to support anti-strike provisions-and in compromises with Democrats, to vote for collective bargaining laws if anti-strike provisions were attached.
Strikes are a basic issue related to collective bargaining. Another (often referred to as right to work) has to do with whether non-members can be required to pay "agency fees" (often equal to dues) to unions that represent them in collective bargaining. Such provisions stand to bring the unions more money, and thus to increase their political power in future years to the advantage of Democrats. Theory suggests that politicians won't be motivated by such considerations. Unions will be, however, and they will pressure Democrats to support agency fee provisions as part of collective bargaining laws. For Republicans, agency fees gain relevance because opposing "forced unionism" has long been an ideological principal among the Republican base, and thus a local concern for individual politicians. We hypothesize (H7), then, 19 that Republicans will be more inclined to vote against collective bargaining laws when they allow for agency fees.
Empirical Findings
We begin our data analysis with two simple questions related to H1: Were Democrats unified, or nearly unified, in their support of collective bargaining? And was Republican support limited to a few crossover votes, or was it substantial? To answer these questions, in Table 2 , we display the percentage of Democrats and Republicans who voted in favor of collective bargaining in each state and year, sorted by the year of the bills' passage.
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In line with our expectations, we find that Democratic support was extremely high in almost all of the states. In three quarters of the cases, more than 90% of the Democrats voted in favor of collective bargaining, and in many of those, Democratic support was unanimous. There were five exceptional cases in which the rate of Democratic support fell below 80%, but two of those were in the South (where many Democrats were conservative), and the remaining three were passed under unusual political circumstances-with some Democrats voting "no" because the bills were not sufficiently friendly to unions. Aside from these unusual cases (which we discuss in greater detail below), the clear pattern among Democrats is near-universal support for public sector bargaining laws.
For Republicans, our findings are eye-opening: Not only did Republicans fail to block collective bargaining laws during this period, as we showed earlier, but in a number of cases, the percentage of Republicans supporting enactment was quite large. In some states, such as (which, as shown in Table 2 , received a low level of support from Democrats).
We focus first on H2-our hypothesis that Republicans from moderate districts were more likely to vote for collective bargaining than Republicans from conservative districts. Using 12 In the online appendix, we also present the results of models using the continuous margin variable, but when we do that, it is not clear how to handle uncontested races. Many of those races were probably uncontested because the expected margins were large (and therefore those legislators should be considered "safe"). However, those margins would have been smaller had an opposing candidate-even a weak one-entered the race. In the online appendix, we exclude legislators from uncontested races. 13 These data are available from the ICPSR's "Work Stoppages Historical File, 1953 File, -1981 22 logistic regression to model state legislators' votes ("yes"=1, "no"=0), we estimate the effect of a legislator's party affiliation (Republican=1, Democrat=0), our measure of state legislative district ideology, and the interaction of the two. In addition, we include our indicators of the bills' strike provisions and agency fee provisions. We cluster the standard errors by state.
The results of this model are set out in the first column of Table 3 . As we expect, the coefficient on Democratic presidential vote is insignificant, suggesting that the ideology of Democrats' districts had no significant relationship to their votes on collective bargaining.
14 However, we find that district ideology did matter for Republicans. At the bottom of column 1, we show that the sum of Democratic presidential vote and its interaction with Republican is positive and significant. From that hypothesis test, we learn that Republicans with moderate constituencies were more likely to favor collective bargaining than Republicans with more conservative constituencies, in support of H2.
In Table 4 , we present some key predicted probabilities from this first model, which help to convey the magnitude of this effect. 15 Specifically, we predict the probability of a "yes" vote for two types of Republicans: "Conservative Republicans" are those from districts where 34% of the presidential vote went to the Democratic candidate (the 5 th percentile) and "Moderate Republicans" are those from districts where 55% of the presidential vote went to the Democratic candidate (the 95 th percentile). In the top row of the table, we focus on the modal type of billone that bans strikes and does not include agency fee provisions. For that type of bill, the predicted probability of a "yes" vote was 63% among conservative Republicans. By contrast, it was 81% for moderate Republicans-an 18 point difference. Clearly, then, Republicans from moderate districts felt greater pressure to support collective bargaining than Republicans from conservative districts.
In that same model, we also find some support for H6-our hypothesis that voting patterns were affected by how the legislation handled strikes. The presence of a strike ban did not significantly affect votes (see Table 3 , model 1), but we do find that legalizing strikes or lessening the penalties for strikes decreased support among Republicans and strengthened support among Democrats. In row 2 of Table 4 , we calculate the predicted probability of a "yes" vote for both conservative and moderate Republicans, this time on bills that allowed strikes (but that still contained no agency fee provisions). We find that conservative Republicans voted "yes" at a rate of 49%-a 14 point decrease from the percentage that approved of collective bargaining when strikes were banned. Support dropped among moderate Republicans as well, from 81% when strikes were banned to 71% when strikes were allowed. Clearly, the way that legislation handled strikes made a difference to the parties' votes.
The inclusion of agency fee provisions in a bill also had a polarizing effect. In model 1
of Table 3 , we find that Republicans were less likely to vote for collective bargaining when the bill explicitly allowed agency fees. 16 And from Table 4 , it is clear that this was a very large effect. There, in row 3, we calculate the predicted probability of voting "yes" on bills that allowed agency fees (but banned strikes). We find that only 20% of conservative Republicans and 39% of moderate Republicans voted "yes" under these circumstances. Thus, the effect of allowing agency fees was an approximately 42 percentage point drop in Republican support for collective bargaining, consistent with H7. 16 The effect of banning agency fees is also significant, but it does not merit extensive discussion because only a single bill banned agency fees. For Republicans, however, the effect of vulnerability is positive: At the bottom of column 2 of Table 3 , we show that the sum of the coefficients on Vulnerable and its interaction with Republican is 0.234, significant at the 10 percent level. Therefore, Republicans elected by small margins were more likely to vote "yes" than Republicans elected by large margins. In Table 4 , we calculate predicted probabilities from the model to examine how large this effect was. 17 We find that vulnerable conservative Republicans voted "yes" at a rate of 62% (see row 4), whereas safe conservative Republicans voted "yes" at a rate of 56% (see row 5). The effect of vulnerability was similar for moderate Republicans: they supported collective bargaining 75%
of the time when they were vulnerable but only 71% of the time when they were not. Thus, the effect of electoral vulnerability was positive and significant, but relatively small-smaller than the effects of district ideology, strike provisions, and agency fee provisions. Table 4 , we present predicted probabilities from this model. 19 We find that moderate
Republicans were 17 to 19 percentage points more likely to vote "yes" than conservative
Republicans. And for vulnerable Republicans, the probability of supporting collective bargaining was 6 to 8 points higher than for safe Republicans. Thus, the evidence supports H2
and H3 even when we examine within-state variation in ideology and vulnerability.
In the final three columns of Table 3 , we test our two hypotheses (H4 and H5) about how government strike activity influenced legislators' positions on collective bargaining. As we discussed earlier, the increasing strike activity of government employee unions was a major political concern in the 1960s. Many experts and political leaders argued that granting public sector workers collective bargaining rights would put an end to the unrest-and until the late between collective bargaining and strike activity. In column 4, we test for this by including the number of government strikes in a given year as an explanatory variable.
As time went on, however, more and more states had experience with collective bargaining, and legislators could look to them for evidence. If it appeared that strike activity declined in states after they adopted duty-to-bargain laws, we would expect Republicans (and Democrats) to continue their support of collective bargaining. But if strike activity stayed the same after adoption-or even increased-we would expect a different pattern: Democrats, as close allies of labor, would persist in their support of collective bargaining, but Republican support would decline.
What, then, would state legislators have observed had they looked to the experiences of other states? Would they have witnessed a decrease in strike activity in states with collective bargaining laws? To investigate this, in Figure 1 , we plot the number of government strikes in each year for 22 states-the states that enacted duty-to-bargain laws for three out of the five categories of government employees at the same time. (We exclude states that extended bargaining rights to only one or two categories of workers at a time, because those states might have continued to experience strikes in pursuit of bargaining rights for the excluded workers.)
The vertical line in each graph depicts the year that the state adopted its law.
The trend immediately apparent in Figure 1 is that in almost all of the states, strike activity tended to increase after they adopted duty-to-bargain laws. In some states, the increase was quite dramatic. In Michigan, which adopted a comprehensive law in 1965, there were only If H5 is correct, then, we should find that Republican support for collective bargaining declined as strike activity continued to increase. We test this expectation in column 4 of Table 3 by adding the square of government strikes as a predictor, interacted with Republican.
For
Republicans, we find that the coefficients on National strikes and its square are both statistically significant at the 1% level-the first positive, and the second negative. Figure 2 depicts the total effect of strike increases on Republicans' votes-and shows how the direction and size of the effect depended on the number of strikes. When overall strike activity was low, the effect of more strikes on Republican support for collective bargaining was positive. But once there were more than 250 strikes per year-levels reached in 1968-the effect of more strike activity on
Republican support was negative.
Again, the predicted probabilities help to demonstrate the magnitude of the effect. In Table 4 , we present the probabilities of a Republican "yes" vote at four different levels of strikes:
the levels of 1963 (29), 1968 (253), 1973 (389), and 1978 (525) . As strike activity increased 20 We are not arguing that the enactment of collective bargaining laws caused an increase in strike activity. Our conclusion from Figure 1 is simply that state legislators could readily observe the increase in strike activity in states that had adopted collective bargaining-and would have witnessed the explosion in strike activity throughout the country. That said, at least one anti-union group did try to make the case for a causal relationship: In a pamphlet widely circulated in 1974 (Public Sector Bargaining and Strikes), the Public Service Research Council argued that the enactment of collective bargaining laws led to an increase in government strikes. See McCartin (2008, p. 141) . 21 We exclude the measure of electoral vulnerability here so that we can include pre-1969 votes.
28 from 1963 levels to 1968 levels, Republicans became much more likely to support collective bargaining. But that support waned as strike activity reached 1973 levels, and it dipped further still as strike activity achieved new highs in the late 1970s. At 525 strikes per year, the predicted probability of a "yes" vote is only 61% for moderate Republicans and 36% for conservative
Republicans.
We next test for the hypothesized decline in Republican support (H5) in a different way:
we create a measure of how Republicans might have thought about the relationship between collective bargaining and strikes at the time of their votes. Specifically, for each state in Figure   1 , we first calculate the average number of strikes per year during the three years prior to its adoption of collective bargaining. Then, for all years after adoption, we subtract this prebargaining baseline from the number of strikes in that particular year. For most states and years, these differences are positive, indicating that strike incidence tended to be higher after adoption than before. (In all years leading up to adoption, we set this difference to zero.) We then sum these differences across all 22 states, by year. This aggregate measure, which we call Postbargaining strikes, captures the extent to which strike activity changed after the adoption of duty-to-bargain laws. We link this measure to the votes in our dataset, using a one-year lag. For example, we assume that an Iowa legislator in 1974 would have considered how much greater strike activity was in bargaining states in 1973 than it had been in years prior to their adoption.
By contrast, the variable Post-bargaining strikes is much smaller for legislators in Washington who cast their votes in 1967, when there were few states to look to for evidence, and therefore little reason to doubt that collective bargaining would reduce strikes.
In column 5 of Table 3 , we include this variable and its interaction with legislator party.
In support of H5, we find that as legislators could witness more and more strikes in states that 29 already had collective bargaining-suggesting that at least in the short run, collective bargaining might not bring labor peace-Republican support declined. We can see this from the hypothesis test at the bottom of column 5: when we add the coefficients of Post-bargaining strikes and its interaction with Republican, we estimate a negative effect, significant at the 1% level.
The predicted probabilities from this model (displayed in Table 4 ) show once again that the effect of strike incidence on Republicans' positions was quite large. For conservative Republicans, shifting from an environment of no strikes in bargaining states (and therefore no reason to doubt that collective bargaining would reduce strikes) to an environment of 206 strikes per year in bargaining states (the maximum in our dataset) reduced the probability of voting "yes" from 89% to 38%. For moderate Republicans, the effect was a change from 96% to 66%.
These results strongly support H5: Republican support decreased as they could observe what was happening in states that had already adopted collective bargaining.
In a final model, we add our measure of electoral vulnerability, which limits the estimation to votes cast between 1969 and 1982. The coefficient estimates are presented in column 6 of Table 3 , and the predicted probabilities are in Table 4 . Even with this limited sample, we find considerable support for our hypotheses. For Republicans, the effects of moderate constituency, vulnerability, and post-bargaining strike incidence are statistically significant predictors of votes, in the expected directions.
Taken together, our findings show that on the issue of collective bargaining, many
Republicans did not act in the interest of their party-they were thinking about themselves.
Nearly two-thirds of the Republican votes in our dataset are "yes" votes. And those "yes" votes were disproportionately likely to come from Republicans who were from moderate districts, who were electorally vulnerable, and who hoped they could prevent government strikes-and avoid 30 the ensuing political fallout-by extending collective bargaining rights to public workers. Thus,
an outcome that appears collectively irrational is entirely sensible when viewed from the standpoint of the incentives of individual legislators: by thinking about their own districts and own constituencies, Republicans played a critical, supportive role in enacting laws that greatly advantaged the Democratic Party.
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Conclusion
Schattschneider's insight that policies make politics has played an influential role, and rightly so, in the modern study of political institutions and public policy. When this notion has taken center stage, the focus has mainly been on how policies give rise to new interests and constituencies that, via policy feedback, shape the future politics of those policies. Important as this line of analysis is, however, there is also an important strategic aspect that arises from Schattschneider's original insight. For if policies do indeed make politics, rational politicians have opportunities to use policies to create a future structure of politics more to their own advantage. 22 Are there any alternative explanations that might account for the patterns in our data? We don't think so-although there are some scenarios that, on the surface, might seem plausible. Of these, perhaps the most notable is that only conservatives saw these labor laws and the rise of public sector unions as bad for the Republican Party, while moderates believed that the unions might be brought into the Republican fold as supporters of the kind of big-tent party that moderates hoped (but failed) to create; these very different assessments of the laws' larger impact on the Republican Party, so the argument goes, might then explain the differences in voting behavior that we find between moderates and conservatives. Yet this explanation doesn't hold up. Very briefly: (1) Whatever the beliefs of moderates and conservatives about party impact, it would still have been irrational for them to act on those beliefs, as their incentive (in a world of weak parties) is to free ride and act on their own individual-level incentives. (2) That aside, our data show that, while moderates were indeed more likely to vote "yes" on these labor laws than conservatives were, the data also show that-in absolute terms-the level of conservative support was actually very high: of the most conservative Republicans (the top 10%), 63% voted "yes." This is critical evidence. Conservatives surely did believe that these laws would have negative impacts on their party, yet they voted "yes" in large numbers-which is consistent with our expectation, rooted in theory, that they were voting without reference to party impacts. This paper is an early effort to move that agenda forward. We develop a theoretical argument that highlights certain basics that we think are essential for understanding how rational politicians do-or don't-use policies to make politics. One of these is that politicians may often have incentives to "make politics" when the political consequences are policy specific.
Another is that, when the consequences involve the larger balance of power between the parties, the incentives of politicians are diluted by collective action problems. As a result, politicians
may not act at all on what seem like obvious opportunities, and indeed, may act in ways that are disadvantageous to their own parties and thus ultimately to themselves. These problems may be (partially) overcome when parties are polarized and homogeneous, as today's parties are. But when parties are more diverse, as they were in decades past, politicians can be expected to take actions that are good for themselves even if very bad for their parties.
Our empirical analysis brings data to bear on a case that is especially instructive: the adoption of public sector labor laws during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s-a development of great political consequence for the larger structure of American politics that hugely favored Democrats over Republicans. What we show, most importantly, is that Republicans actually played pivotal roles in passing these labor laws, and thus in shaping the future structure of 32 politics to their own disadvantage. They behaved rationally as individuals, responding to district and constituency concerns of relevance to them as politicians-and not to the collective goods (or bads) that were being generated for their party. On a matter of key importance to the larger structure of politics, then, the collective action problem was indeed disabling.
As we look ahead, various implications offer promising avenues for advancing this Schattschneider-based agenda, but several stand out. One begins with our argument that, while it is precisely when the political stakes are broadly consequential for the parties that politicians have weak incentives to "make politics," the flip side is that they are likely to have stronger incentives when the consequences are policy-specific. The opportunities for such policy-specific decisions are omnipresent across policy realms and time-making them quite central to an understanding of political dynamics, and attractive targets for new political research.
Among other things, research along these lines needs to explore the key qualifications we mentioned earlier, and just how problematic they actually are in the policymaking process. To what extent are politicians aware that they can use the design of policy to shape its future politics? Does their characteristic myopia prevent them from being concerned about, and taking steps to enhance, the long term durability of the policies they support? Does the attractiveness of position-taking and credit-claiming mean that their support for a policy implies no genuine commitment to its ultimate success, and no incentive to create a favorable future politics?
Perhaps most important, research on these qualifying conditions needs to be combined with new research on interest groups-for interest groups are likely to have incentives to care about the durability of policy, and to pressure politicians to "make politics" in ways that promote it. So far, this is a dimension of interest group behavior that has never been systematically studied. But it needs to be. And new work along these lines may well show, as we would 33 expect, that interest groups can play key roles in overcoming the incentive-weaknesses of politicians, and activating them to do what they might not otherwise do on their own.
Another line of inquiry calling out for new research has to do with those policies, like labor laws, that are broadly consequential for the parties. Here research needs to center on the collective action problems that weaken the incentives of politicians to "make politics"-but it also needs to recognize that these problems are not always disabling. The situation is more nuanced than that, and as a result there is much to explore about when these problems are disabling and when they aren't. Here too, research needs to shed much more light on the role of interest groups, and specifically, on whether at least some types of groups-business and labor, conservative and liberal activists, and other groups wedded to one or the other party-may play roles that go beyond specific policy realms in pressuring politicians to do what is best for their parties.
That said, the top priority is clearly research on the parties themselves, and their capacity to get members to cooperate in "making politics" to their collective advantage. As we've said, today's strong parties should be much better positioned to do this than parties were in past decades. This is a basic claim that, in itself, calls out for historical research on how parties have differentially acted through time to "make politics"-research that stands to shed light on a dimension of party behavior that has yet to be systematically explored. Along the way, research needs to determine whether the potential impact of policies on the partisan balance of power does indeed have greater incentive-value in recent decades-due to the cooperation-inducing role of strong parties-and thus helps explain the political dynamics behind some of the salient, politics-making issues of our time: from immigration reform to Obamacare to union "card check" legislation.
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The argument we've developed in this paper is just a start. What it points to, for now, are the substantial limits on the incentives of politicians to "make politics" through the design of policy, the key roles of interest groups and parties in (potentially) overcoming those limits, and the likelihood that these organizations can often be at least partially successful at doing that.
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